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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.JOSljJPH E. NELSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CL.YD E~ L. MILLER, as Secretary 
of State of the State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
12258 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF' 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
By minute entry dated October 9, 1970, this Court 
has, upon hearing the parties arguments in this action, 
onlered that the plaintiff's name be placed upon the 
Lallot for possible election on November 3, 1970. There-
fore, in the pres011t posture of this litigation, no issue 
is 1·aise<l concerning the denial by the defendant Sec-
rdm·~, of State of plaintiff's request to stand for elec-
tion. ~~eeonli11gly, we ha,·e limited our decision below to 
those issue directlv related to the constitutionality of . . 
tl1(• mandatory retirement statute. 
In plaintiff's l\Iemorandum two assertions were 
made concerning the constitutionality of Sec. 49-7-1.1. 
1 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The first argument <lemo11strated that the statute in ques-
tion is inconsistent with both the terms and the intent of 
the constitutional amendment authorizing the enactment 
of a system of mandatory retirement of judicial person-
nel. Secondly, it was argued that the present statute 
contravenes other constitutional provisions of Article 
VIII which establish the requirements to be met in the 
election to, and occupancy of, judicial office in this state. 
The requisite standards of age, knowledge and character 
are explicitly defined in Article VIII. Consequently thesr 
standards can be neither augmented nor eroded by leg-is-
lative direction. Therefore, even if the statute under 
examination could be considered apart from the underly-
ing constitutional amendment, it remains invalid because 
of inconsistency with independent constitutional require-
ments. 
In the discussion below, we have set our additional 
considerations which also point to the validity of each 
of these conclusion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTION 49-7-1.1 IS BEYOND THE 
SCOPE OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 28 
AND IS THEREFORE I~V ALID. 
In the :Memorandum previously submitted, it wa~ 
established that no reasonable interpretation of the 
above cited amendment could support the scheme of man-
datory retirement emobdied in Section 49-7-1.l. To up-
2 
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ltold the validity of the statute under the amendment 
would necessarily render the latter provision meaning-
less. In addition to this textual deficiency, the inconsis-
tency of the statute, when compared to the amendment, 
i;;; demonstrated by equally compelling practical con-
siderations. 
As the statute in question was conceived by the legis-
lature, retirement at a given age is compulsory, even if 
the particular judge being retired is obviously still quali-
fied to serve. Under a supplementary provision of the 
.J u<lges' Retirement Act, Section 49-7 -5. 7, such a judge 
could be called back to serve either as a district judge or 
upon the Supreme Court. Not only does this provision 
indicate legislative recognition of the actual intent of 
the amendment, i.e. service according to ability; it also 
creates the statutory possibility of lifetime tenure of 
judicial persom1el, uneffected and uninterrupted by 
election, age or lack of capacity. When a judge is retired 
under Section 49-7-1.1, then another must be duly nomi-
11atecl and elected to fill the vacancy. After such an 
election, the retired juclge has no constitutionally valid 
l'laim or authority for continued judicial service.1 Yet 
under the provisions of Section 49-7-5.7, he may be call-
ed upon to serve and receive full pay for such service, 
whirh may extend for any period deemed appropriate 
hy the presiding judge of the Supreme Court. 
Like the statutory provision at issue, Subsection 
.). I was adopted wholesale from equivalent federal legis-
'See infra, pp. 5-6. 
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I 
I 
la ti on.~ The only way Subsections 1.1 and 5.7 and Sec- I 
tion 28 of Article VIII can be meaningfully reconciled i 
is to ascribe to each of them the meaning clearly ap- 1 
parent from the text of the amendment and implicit in 
the federal statutory program. Service as a function of 
demonstrated capacity is the principle underlying both 
the federal legislation and the state constitutional amern1-
ment. The federal statute provides for a system of per-
missive retirement; the age limits apply only to deter-
mine qualification for retirement at full pay. The opera-
tive provisions of both the ameuclment to the state con-
stitution and the statute allowing continuing service are 
premised on a similar principle of limiting service only 
in the face of objective findings of actual inability to 
serve. Only when Subsection 1.1 is similarly construed, 
can it stand consistently with the other sections of the 
retirement statute, ancl, as we have argued, with the 
amendment itself. If retirement or removal under that 
provision were premised upon some finding of deficient 
conduct - as the amendment clearly directs - then con-
tinued service upon a "case hy case" basis would not 
be possible for any judge so retired since the standard 
for service under both Subsection 1.1 and 5.7 would be 
the same, namely, physical and mental ability. Accord-
ingly, disqualification under one would necessarily indi-
cate disqualification under the other and therefore, de 
facto lifetime tenure nuder the latter provisions would 
not be possible. 
~see 28 U.S.C.A. §294. 
4 
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POINT II 
THE AGE Lnrrrs IMPOSED BY SEC-
TION 49-7-1.1 CONTRAVENE THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL MANDATE OF UNIFORMITY 
AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE VIII, SEC-
TION 28. 
The mandate of Article VIII, Section 28, requires 
the legislature to establish, "uniform standards for 
mandatory retirement." (emphasis added) The concept 
of uniformity, as applied to classes within a group, re-
r1uires that distinctions should not be of capricious or 
arbitrary nature and that they ha\'e a rational basis. 3 In 
addition, any differences between classes within a group 
should be both practical and substantial and not merely 
represent a factitious equality.' 
In State r. Packard, 250 P.2d 561, (Utah 1952), 
ibis court held that, 
''a statute is unconstitutional, as being unreason-
ably discriminatory, if it differentiates between 
such classes without any reasonable basis bearing 
on purpose sought to be accomplished by the 
statute." 259 P.2d at 556. 
It is the plaintiff's position that no such reasonable 
lJasis exists to allow this court to determine that ~49-7-1.1 
is constitutional. The distinction contained in that pro-
\'ision allows only for factitious equality which is dis-
C'riminatorv and therefore, violative of the equal pro-.' ' 
trction clause of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution 
of the United States. 
"16 Am. Jur. 2d §498. 
4 ld., §499. 
5 
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On a practical basis, plaintiff's position is further 
supported by the fact that district court judges are al-
lowed to serve on the Supreme Court by invitation when 
the need arises. If a district judge is qualified to serve 
as a member of the :Supreme Court prior to age 70, what 
reasonable basis can disqualify him from serving in the 
same capacity upon attaining age 70 and not disqualify 
a Supreme Court judge at age 70 for the same reasons. 
POINT III 
THE REMOVAL OR DISQUALIFICA-
TION OF AN ELECTED JUDGE UNDER 
THE AUTHORITY OF SECTION 49-7-1.1 
CON"TRAVENES THE CONSTITUTIONAL-
LY DEFINED REQUIREMENTS AND PRO-
CEDURES FOR ELECTION TO AND OCCU-
p ANY OF JUDICIAL OFFICE. 
In oral argument, the case of Boughton u. Price, 35 
P.2d 775, (Ida. 1950), was cited by <lefendant as author-
ity for the proposition that where a constitution sets out 
certain minimal requirements for eligibility for consti-
tutional office, it is ~within the power of the legislature 
to aff ectin~ly supplement these minimal qualifications. 
HoweYer, the general rule in this regard is that where 
a stat<:> eonstitution lavs dovvn specific eligibility require-
mc11ts for a particular office, such constitutional sp<:>cifi-
cation is exclusiv<:>, ancl absent some express grant of 
authority, the legislature is ~without po'ser to require ad-
ditional or different qualifications. Whitney L'. Boli11, 
330 P.2d 1003, (Ariz. 1938); TY all ace r. Superior Court, 
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298 P.2d 69 (Cal. 1956) ; State ex. rel. Chapman v. Appl-
i11g, 348 P.2d 759, (Ore. 1960); And See Anno., A.L.R.2d 
171. Thus in State ex. rel. Stain v. Christensen., 35 P.2d 
775, (Utah 1934), this court recognized that, 
There is eminent authority and good reason 
to support the doctrine that when a constitution 
prescribes eligibility for an office, its declarations 
are conclusive of the whole matter whether the 
language used is affirmative or negative in form. 
35 P.2d at 780. 
The court went on to hold that this principle could not 
be applied to invalidate a statute requiring the state 
treasurer to undertake a bond as a condition for holding 
office since such a requirement was sufficiently "foreign 
to the subject matter of eligibility for office.'' The in-
stant statute deals explicitly with eligibility for office 
and therefore, under the principle established by the 
above cited case, is explicitly invalid. 
Even if it were determined that Sec. 49-7-1.1 was 
not, standing alone, an impermissible addition to the 
stated constitutional requirements for judicial office, 
it cannot be considered apart from the constitutional 
amendment it seeks to implement. When its departure 
from the scope of that amendment is added to its author-
ized modification of the stated requirements for judicial 
office, the unconstitutionality of the provision seems 
plainly evident. Indeed, each constitutional defect ag-
gravates the severity of the other. 
7 
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POINT IV 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 
49-7-1.1 IS STATE ACTION \VHICH VIO-
LATES THE FOURTEENTH AJ\IENDl\IENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITU-
TION. 
Section 1 of Amendment XIV of the Constitution of 
the United States provides as follows: 
''All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and the State where-
in they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
an:v law which shall a bridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of lmv; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the law.'' 
Holding an elective office is a privilege. DepriYing 
one of the right to hold elective office by reason of maxi-
mum age alone is an unreasonable deprivation of this 
privilege, and violative of tlw rn·evionsly quoted section 
of the l~nited States Constitution. 
The same constitutional section states that a State 
may not deprive any person of life, libert~-, or proper!~', 
without due process of la\L The loss of the right to work, 
merely by reason of maximum age <•lone, is loss of a 
8 
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l 
I 
' 
I 
property right which is protected by the above mentioned 
eo11stitutional provision. The Utah Constitution also 
prohihits deprivation of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of la\1', whe11 it provides in Article 1, Sec-
tion 7, 
"No person shall he deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law.'' 
The right to work, the right to engage in gainful 
employment, and the right to receive compensation for 
one's work, are essentially property rights, McGrew v. 
l11rl11sfrial Commission, 85 P.2d 608, (Utah 1938). 
The above mentioned constitutional provision for-
bids a State from denying any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws. Traditionally, 
this amendment prohibits discrimination by reason of 
race, creed, or color. It may be reasonable for the State, 
through legislative action, to set standards for office 
holders (for example, that a Judge must be an attorney 
admitted to practice in the State), but to establish a 
maximum age limit as the sole basis of disqualification 
to hold office is unreasonable and denies the equal pro-
h•ction guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 
9 
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CONCLUSION 
On the basis of all of the foregoing propositions, 
plaintiff respectfully urges that Section 49-7-1.1 be de-
clared unconstitutional. 
Dated this 26th day of October, 1970. 
Dennis F. Olsen, 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & 
McCarthy 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Richard JU. Taylor 
275 North Main Street 
Spanish Fork, Utah 
Paul H. Liapis, 
Gustin & Gustin 
1610 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Jackson B. Howard 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
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